There is an extensive literature on the extent to which public health insurance coverage through Medicaid induces less private health insurance coverage. However, little is known about the effect of other components of the health care safety net in crowding out private coverage. We examine the effect of Medicaid and uncompensated care provided by clinics and hospitals on insurance coverage. We construct a long panel of metropolitan area data on hospital uncompensated care and free and reduced price care offered by Federally Qualified Health Centers. We match this information to individual level data on coverage from the Current Population Survey. Our preliminary results provide mixed evidence on the extent of crowd-out. Hospital care appears to have little crowd-out effect, but clinic care does substantially crowd out private coverage in some specifications. We are also able to examine other hypotheses on takeup and crowd-out using our individual data and metropolitan area level characteristics.
Introduction
An issue that has attracted a great deal of attention in recent years is whether changes in Medicaid eligibility have crowded-out private employer-provided health insurance coverage (Dubay and Kenney 1997; Cutler and Gruber 1997) . Less well understood, however, is the role of the local safety net in affecting low-income workers' decisions to accept employer-provided health insurance for themselves and their families. From the standpoint of low-income workers, a more dependable safety net may induce individuals to accept employment without health insurance or decline employer-provided coverage for themselves or their dependents, particularly in the face of rising health insurance premiums and rising cost-sharing. A recent study by the Commonwealth Fund examining uninsured workers supports these contentions, suggesting that the uninsured often believe they can "get around insurance" by going to free clinics (Perry, Kennel, and Castillo 2000, pg. 17) . From the standpoint of small employers, the availability of safety net health care services may induce firms, particularly smaller firms, firms hiring predominantly low-wage, low-skill workers, or firms in economically depressed areas, not to offer health insurance to workers.
Recent data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) suggest that in 1998 only 54.7% of employees in lowwage establishments were offered insurance and only 29.9% of employees took up coverage in these firms (AHRQ, 2000) . Further, recent data from a national employer survey indicate that among small firms (3-199 employees) only 35% of firms with a large fraction of low-wage employees offered health insurance (Kaiser Family Foundation and HRET 2000) . This occurred despite the fact that the offer rate among all small firms rose from 59% to 67% between 1996 and 2000. Moreover, evidence from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) suggests that among persons who lose health insurance coverage, 60% indicated that the reason for losing coverage is that insurance is too expensive and they cannot afford health insurance. Thus, it is clear that among low-income workers and small, low-wage firms, health insurance coverage decisions may respond strongly to financial conditions. It is these workers and firms for whom community safety net services may represent a viable alternative to traditional coverage options.
While a number of previous studies have focused on how the Medicaid expansions of the late 1980s and early 1990s affected private provision of health insurance (e.g., Cutler and Gruber 1996 , Dubay and Kenney 1997 , Blumberg, et al. 2000 , Yazici and Kaestner 2000 , few studies have attempted to relate private insurance take-up to characteristics of local health care markets. The prior studies in this area suffer from notable shortcomings, including measurement problems that did not allow for precise measures of the safety net in a particular area, the inability to deal adequately with endogeneity concerns, and short time periods of analysis.
Data from the Census Bureau indicate that in 2001 there were 41.2 million people lacking health insurance. While many of these people may be eligible for public programs, this number represents the individuals most at risk of using safety net health care services should they become ill. Recent studies have suggested that the care provided by health care safety net providers has grown in recent years. For example, 41% of 8.3 million FQHC patients in 1998 were uninsured, and between 1990 witnessed a 60% increase in the number of uninsured patients (Bureau of Primary Health Care 1990 . In 2000 nearly $21 billion in uncompensated care was provided by short-term general non-federal hospitals.
Our study uses data from March Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Demographic File for the years 1990 to 2000 to measure health insurance coverage. The CPS data are combined with detailed measures on local health care facilities to examine the link between local safety net characteristics and private health insurance coverage. Our safety net measures include total MSA-level hospital uncompensated care (UC) derived from the American Hospital Association's annual survey of hospitals, divided by the MSA population under age 65. Because public hospitals have a special mission to provide care to the indigent, we also calculated the total number of public hospital beds in the MSA per capita. We measure the MSA-level provision of UC provided at Federally Qualified Health Centers.
Unfortunately, a higher fraction of the population not covered by health insurance may mean that a higher fraction of care provided at hospitals and clinics goes unpaid and is classified as uncompensated care. Thus, we must instrument for the potential endogeneity of our safety net measures. As instruments we include the generosity of the state's disproportionate care (DSH) program. We also include federal support for health centers. In addition, we include measures of MSA-level tax appropriations to hospitals and health clinics. Finally, we include a state budget surplus or deficit measure. All of these instrumental variables can plausibly be argued to affect the willingness of health care providers to provide uncompensated care, but not directly affect the willingness of individuals to forgo health insurance for themselves and their dependents. However, whether these variables are correlated with unobserved determinants of coverage rates will be an issue we discuss.
Prior Literature
Rask and Rask (2000) conducted two separate analyses to examine the role of public hospitals and public programs in health insurance coverage decisions. First, they used the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES) data to examine how the presence of public hospitals affected health insurance coverage. They found that among individuals with income between 100 and 200% of the poverty line, the presence of a public hospital crowded out nearly 11% of persons who would otherwise be privately insured. Among middle-income individuals (income between 200 and 400% of the poverty line), public hospitals crowded out nearly 4% of persons who would otherwise be privately insured. The second component of their study used data from the 1989 and 1992 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) to measure the effects on health coverage of residing in a state with an uncompensated care funding pool and of AFDC and Medicaid program characteristics. The authors found that uncompensated care funds were associated with a higher rate of uninsurance and lower rates of Medicaid and private insurance.
Their analysis, while the first of its kind and innovative in many respects, is weak for several reasons. First, the authors did not have access to the geographic location of the NMES respondents. The authors were only able to match to their data to a rough indicator for proximity to a public hospital. Moreover, without geographic identifiers the authors were unable to control for other local (or state) characteristics that can affect health insurance coverage; they were similarly unable to control for Medicaid eligibility. As a result, their findings regarding the impact of public hospitals on health insurance coverage call for more convincing evidence. Second, in their analysis using the NHIS, the presence of an uncompensated care reimbursement fund provides no information on the generosity of statewide support of safety net providers and safety net care in general. Finally, by covering the period 1987-1992, the study misses several key policy changes that have potentially had a dramatic effect on safety net providers. These include the dramatic increase in the Medicaid disproportionate share program, the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), and welfare reform, all of which were likely to result in changes to provider, employer, and employee behavior.
Research by Herring (2001) uses cross-sectional data from the 1996-1997 Community Tracking Study (CTS) to examine the effect of self-reported access to charity care on health insurance coverage. To measure the extent of local charity care services, the author uses the MSA-level average among the uninsured for the question concerning whether the uninsured person had cost-related difficulty obtaining health care. While this measure of access to charity care does incorporate all potential sources of care individuals may receive (indeed it is positively correlated with hospital charity care provision and FQHC concentration), it does not present a readily interpretable policy "lever" and it is likely to incorporate a lot of other factors not related to safety net services, such as health status. The author attempts to instrument for the potential endogeneity of the access measure by relying on "social capital" variables, but none of the variables are directly related to the incentives that providers have to actually provide uncompensated care to poor uninsured individuals. Herring finds that access to charity care is negatively associated with private health insurance coverage of low income individuals.
Theoretical Considerations
Hospitals and clinics provide uncompensated care because it is part of their mission and they face statutory requirements to provide care in certain circumstances. However, funding from various sources--federal, state and local governments and foundations--encourages hospitals and clinics to provide safety net care. These governmental levers are important tools in insuring that care is provided for those without insurance. By making it less costly to provide uncompensated care, these government transfers are expected to induce greater provision of uncompensated care.
The provision of uncompensated care by health centers and hospitals then in turn affects individual and firm decisions. Safety net care affects individual decisions to take up employer offered insurance. Individuals weigh the attributes and costs of alternative health care arrangements. Employer provided health insurance is likely to have greater costs than Medicaid or safety net care both in terms of premiums and out of pocket costs such as deductibles and copayments. However, it may have more favorable attributes such as shorter waiting times and more sure receipt of care. A more extensive safety net, provided by health clinics and hospitals, may induce individuals to conclude that the cost of employer provided coverage is too high.
The firm offer decision also depends on safety net care. Firms must aggregate the preferences of their workers. Firms must decide whether the health benefits they provide allow them to lower their offered wages enough to pay for the firm share of premiums. They must weigh how the tax advantages and lower group cost of providing health insurance affect the willingness of workers to accept lower wages. This willingness is affected by income and other determinants of demand for health care as well as the other health care options available to workers. Those other options include safety net care at clinics and hospitals. The extent of this safety net will then likely affect the decision of firms to provide health insurance as well as the terms under which this insurance is offered.
Institutional Background
The health care safety net in the US represents a patchwork of providers that is supported by a diverse and often haphazard array of funding mechanisms. The fraction of Americans without health insurance in 2001 is little changed at 14.6% from the 14.8% recorded in 1987. However, in the intervening years, the fraction spiked to 16.3% in 1998. The uninsured, as well as many under-insured and Medicaid insured patients, often depend on safety net providers to meet their health care needs. During this period of change in the number of uninsured persons in the 1990s, health care industry restructuring and changes in the public financing of health care providers may have significantly affected safety net providers.
A. Safety Net Providers
Defining what is encompassed by the health care safety net is a challenge. In a recent report issued by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) on the health care safety net (IOM, 2000) , the IOM committee used a general approach, defining the safety net as "providers that organize and deliver a significant level of health care and other related services to uninsured, Medicaid and other vulnerable patients." This definition, however, does not lend itself to the measurement of the extent of safety net care that is provided.
Urban public hospitals devote a large fraction of their health care provision to Medicaid and uninsured populations (Baxter and Mechanic 1997) . Approximately 70% of urban public hospital inpatient days in 1995 were for Medicaid or self pay patients. Public hospitals also provide a large volume of outpatient services to safety net populations. 77% of their outpatient and emergency room visits were for Medicaid (34%) and self-pay (43%) patients.
Academic Health Centers (AHCs) also provide a large amount of care to safety net populations (Mann et al. 1997) . In their markets, AHCs provide 37% of uncompensated (hospital) care and 31.5% of Medicaid (hospital) care, while only representing 7.3% of hospitals. For public AHCs (3.5% of hospitals) the corresponding figures are 26.2% of uncompensated care, 19.8% of Medicaid (Reuter and Gaskin, 1997) . While private not for profit (NFP) hospitals vary significantly in their roles as safety net providers, as a group these hospitals also form an important part of the safety net. In 1994, private NFPs (not including private AHCs) provided close to 50% of all uncompensated hospital care and over 50% of all Medicaid hospital care. Given the large amount of uncompensated care that is provided throughout the hospital industry, it is clearly not appropriate to use arbitrary classifications of hospitals by public status or teaching status alone to determine safety net health care provision (Zuckerman et al. 2001) .
In a primarily descriptive study of safety net hospitals and how they fared between 1990 and 1997, Zuckerman et al. (2001) identified three groups of safety net hospitals based on whether they contribute a high fraction of the market's total UC or whether a high fraction of the hospital's costs are uncompensated or both. Hospitals displaying both attributes remained the 6 most important providers of uncompensated care and, despite experiencing stagnant growth in admissions and losses in the number of births relative to non-safety net hospitals, virtually never closed. Hospitals with high market share continued their important role, but did reduce the share of the uncompensated care they provided relative to non-safety net hospitals. These facilities also appeared to be the most attractive merger partners, indicating that hospital involvement as a substantial market provider of indigent care is not a barrier to merger. Hospitals that had a high ratio of UC to costs were generally smaller and most at risk of closing.
FQHCs have a clear mission to serve the poor. In 1997 approximately 4 million of their patients are uninsured (almost 10% of all uninsured), while another 3.6 million are Medicaid recipients (approximately 10% of all Medicaid recipients). The remaining patients are Medicare recipients (0.9 million) or privately insured (0.9 million) (Hawkins and Rosenbaum, 1998) .
Safety net providers generally offer a combination of comprehensive medical care and "enabling" services, such as language translation and transportation, that target the needs of those likely to require safety net health care (IOM 2000) . Safety net providers also offer specialized services; in 1997, National Association of Public Hospital (NAPH) members represented 17% of hospital beds in the markets, but provided more than 25% of neonatal intensive care beds, 66% of burn care beds, 33% of pediatric intensive care beds, 45% of Level 1 trauma center visits, and 24% of emergency department visits (NAPH 1999).
B. Safety Net Policies and Market Forces
A number of policy and market factors have affected the environment in which safety net providers operate. Medicaid disproportionate share (DSH) payments increased dramatically in the early 1990s from $1.4 billion in 1990 to $17.5 billion in 1992 (Coughlin, Ku, and Kim 2000) . Since the late 1980s, private HMO market shares have risen from 19 to 35% in 2001 (Foster Higgins/Mercer 1998 , 2003 . Since the 1994, Medicaid managed care has risen from 14 to 57% of beneficiaries. Welfare reform and the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997, which ushered in the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), have transformed Medicaid eligibility and reimbursement policies.
Federal and state subsidy programs for health care providers are intended to make up the difference between payments safety net providers receive and the costs incurred through caring for the uninsured. DSH payments are the primary method for states to subsidize hospitals. Although the DSH program was enacted in the early 1980s, states were slow to capitalize on the program until the late 1980s when individual states began to develop creative methods to use the DSH program to increase their Medicaid funding (Fishman and Bentley 1997) . Other states quickly copied the approaches of pioneers and DSH payments to states grew dramatically. The federal government passed reforms in 1991 and 1993 to attempt to control the growth in DSH payments. DSH payments leveled off after 1993 and subsequently fell after 1996 from around $18 billion to around $15 billion where they have remained since. However, state responses to the 1993 reforms varied considerably (Coughlin and Liska 1998) . Some states increased the number of types of providers to whom they made DSH payments, including mental health providers, for example. Other states were unable or unwilling to spend their full DSH allotments. For example, Colorado intentionally kept its DSH spending low to avoid the possible need to make up for lost federal DSH payments should the federal government cut DSH funding (Coughlin and Liska 1998) . Michigan, by contrast, reduced DSH payments because prior to the 1993 reforms the state was retaining federal DSH revenues as general revenues instead of using them for safety net providers (GAO 1994) .
FQHCs have historically been financed through cost-based reimbursement, federal grants from the Bureau of Primary Health Care (BPHC), and in some cases state and local subsidies. Some evidence suggests that cost-based reimbursement has allowed FQHCs to expand their provision of health care to the uninsured through cost-shifting (Ku, Wade, and Dodds 1996) . The BBA and its subsequent refinement, the Benefits Improvement & Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA), introduced the gradual faze-out of cost-based reimbursement. Federal grants to FQHCs have grown steadily throughout the 1990s from roughly $550 million in 1990 to $925 million in 1999 (National Association of Community Health Centers 1999).
State and local funding for the safety net is highly variable across the country (Meyer et al. 1999) , and often can be used to make up for low federal subsidies (Norton and Lipson 1998). Local sources of non-operating revenues for hospitals and other safety net providers are widely variable, but can be aided by a few factors. One factor is ability of the county to have taxing authority and the willingness to use discretionary funds to support safety net providers (Meyer et al. 1999 ). The same is true for city-based public health departments. Many communities such as New York and Los Angeles have a long history of supporting safety net institutions, while others are less supportive (Baxter and Mechanic 1997) .
Growing use of managed care in Medicaid heightens competition among providers over Medicaid patients, which represents a potential threat to safety net providers because Medicaid revenues often comprise an important portion of total revenues for safety net providers and have historically helped such providers cross-subsidized health care to the uninsured (Norton and Lipson 1998). Although some studies have shown that some safety net providers fared better than anticipated after increases in Medicaid managed care (Hoag, Norton, and Rajan 2000) , other studies have been indicated mixed successes on the part of safety net providers in response the Medicaid managed care pressures (North and Lipson 1998). Campbell and Ahern (1993) also found that California hospitals with greater Medicaid and Medicare contractual allowances (i.e., lower payment rates), provided less uncompensated care.
Similar to the Medicaid market, private purchasers of health care have aggressively pursued cost reductions through capitated managed care contracts. Studies have indicated that increasing private HMO penetration has been associated with increased price-based competition. Such competition potentially threatens the private pay patient base, which is frequently used to subsidize the cost of treating the uninsured (Norton and Lipson 1998). In addition, price competition in the private payer realm can make Medicaid reimbursement rates look relatively more attractive, which can heighten competition for Medicaid patients among safety net providers (Fishman and Bentley 1997) . Studies have suggested that increased private HMO penetration have been associated with relatively greater reductions in patient volumes at hospitals serving predominantly safety net populations (Gaskin 1997) .
Data and Methods
1 We begin with children in part because Cutler and Gruber (1997) found that fairly straightforward methods like those that we employ here yielded very similar estimates to their later approach that accounted for the Medicaid coverage of the entire family. We combine information from four large datasets as well as several smaller datasets to produce our estimates. We focus of a long time period, the years 1990-2000, during which there were substantial changes in our key safety net measures. The study focuses on children 14 and under in most of the analyses, but we also examine all children under 18 in some cases.
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A. Health Insurance Coverage Data
We rely on the health insurance coverage data from the Current Population Survey because it is the only data source with comparable questions asked over the time period we analyze. The CPS also provides a very large sample with good geographic detail, which facilitates our analysis of local health care safety nets. In the March Annual Demographic File, the CPS reports responses to questions about coverage through various sources for the previous year. We use the files for survey years 1991-2001 to obtain data for the reference years 1990-2000. The data allow us to examine whether a child had health insurance coverage of any type, as well as whether the coverage was public, or private, and whether private coverage was employer or union provided.
B. Geographic Unit of Analysis
Only hospitals and clinics within a reasonable traveling distance from a family constitute the local health care safety net. Thus, an analysis of state data would not provide a useful study since those on one side of a state are unaffected by clinics on the other side of the state. On the other hand, an analysis of counties would lead to mismeasured key variables as people are able to travel to neighboring counties, especially individuals who live near county borders. Thus, we use metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) as our unit of analysis. MSAs are defined by commuting patterns and thus provide a sensible local geographic unit.
The large number of MSAs provides us with a large number of independent observations. In all, 281 MSAs are identified over our sample period. The definition of some MSAs changed in the CPS, starting with the data for 1995.
2 When there is a substantial change in the definition, we take the redefined MSA to be a different geographic unit in the empirical analysis. Only MSAs that satisfy several additional criteria are included. Specifically, we only include MSAs defined by counties to facilitate matching, we only include those MSAs where the CPS sample frame is close to the MSA definition, and we only include those without suppressed hospital data. We end up with 1637 MSA-years of data. In order to match our various data sources together we rely on zip code and county information. Then, using files that link zip codes with counties and counties with MSAs, we are able to use either country or zip code information to 9 link our data sources. In the cases where we use state level variables (usually in constructing instruments used in IV estimates) we combine state variables for multi-state MSAs using state shares of the population.
C. Hospital Safety Net Care
Data on hospitals come from the American Hospital Association's Annual Survey of hospitals for the years 1990-2000. Because of the confidential nature of the financial measures, individual hospital values are aggregated to the MSA level using zip codes. To preserve hospital confidentiality, MSAs with fewer than three hospitals are dropped from the analysis.
All short-term, general, non-federal hospitals are included in the MSA-level variables. Because our analysis is focused on urban areas, only urban hospitals will be included in our measures. We measure uncompensated care (UC) as the sum of bad debt, which is defined as, "the provision for actual or expected uncollectibles resulting from the extension of credit," and charity care, which is defined as, "health services that were never expected to result in cash inflows… [which] results from a provider's policy to provide health care services free of charge to individuals who meet certain financial criteria." Uncompensated care is reported on the basis of forgone revenue, at "list" price. Because of contractual arrangements, hospitals rarely receive the full charged price for services, thus list price does not reflect the true cost associated with providing the services. To correct for this, we convert hospital UC values from charges to expenses by using two different measures of the ratio of costs to charges (RCC): 1. [total expense -bad debt expense]/[Gross patient revenues + other operating revenues] and 2. Net patient revenue/Total gross patient revenue. The alternative transformations will serve as a check on the robustness of the approach. 3 We are concerned about the potential endogeneity of hospital uncompensated care. If fewer children are covered in an MSA, then a higher fraction of services provided by hospitals might go unpaid, and thus be classified as uncompensated care. Thus, we also consider variables that could be used as instruments for hospital safety net care. We use as instruments two measures of financial support for safety net hospitals. The first variable is Medicaid Disproportionate Share dollars per capita for the state(s) in which the MSA is located. The DSH program supported hospitals and clinics providing a disproportionate share of of Medicaid and uncompensated care. The nature and history of the DSH program was described in more detail in Section 4.
The second instrument is a measure of hospital tax appropriations. From the AHA Annual Survey we obtained total tax appropriations received by hospitals within an MSA over the years 1990-2000. This measure reflects payment received by hospitals from state and local governments. In the year 2000 among short-term general non-federal hospitals, 59% of all public hospitals reported some tax appropriations, while roughly 22% of non-profit hospitals and 41% of for-profit hospitals received some tax appropriations. In 2000 hospitals reported a total of $2.8 billion in tax appropriations, of which over 90% was distributed to public hospitals.
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Public hospitals received in aggregate approximately $2.5 billion in tax appropriations, for an average of just over $14 million per hospital for the 178 public hospitals that reported some tax appropriations. By contrast, for-profit hospitals received a total of $62 million in tax appropriations for an average of just over $320,000 per hospital for the 193 for-profit hospitals that reported some tax appropriations. Not-for-profit hospitals reported a total of $192 million in tax appropriations, for an average of $500,000 per hospital for the 385 not-for-profit hospitals that reported some tax appropriations.
D. Community Health Centers
We incorporate information on the services provided by Community Health Centers (CHCs) and their finances during the years 1990-2000. The primary data sources we use are the Bureau's Common Reporting Requirements (BCRR) data (for the years 1990-1995) and the Uniform Data System (UDS) files (for the years 1996 to 2000). UDS and BCRR data are provided by grantees of several primary care system development programs administered by the Bureau of Primary Health Care. The program we are most interested in is the Community Health Center Program (Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act).
4 Centers report extensive information on the number and types of people who receive services at the center. The data also contain extensive financial information on types of expenditures and sources of revenue.
The key variables we extract are the dollar value of sliding payment scale adjustments (discounts) provided by a center and the dollar value of bad debt written-off by a center. These variables are then summed and calculated on a per person under 65 basis for the MSA. This variable, which we call center uncompensated care is the key clinic safety net variable that we use. All variables (except for number of centers) are also adjusted at the center level to exclude migrants, homeless, and users 65 or older. We also adjust for sites that are outside the main MSA.
Thus, we also consider variables that could be used as instruments for center safety net care. Our two instruments are: 1. federal funding provided to health centers, and 2. state, local and private financial support for centers. Both variables are obtained from the UDS and BCRR data.
E. Medicaid and SCHIP
We control for Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility in our analyses because eligibility for public insurance may affect private coverage through the same mechanisms described above for safety net care. There is an extensive literature examining the effect of public coverage on private coverage. We are also interested in the effect of the safety net on coverage of any kind, and Medicaid/SCHIP is a key determinant of any coverage.
We calculate an indicator variable for Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility using long and detailed eligibility calculator that accounts for the Medicaid expansions, waivers, SCHIP provisions, and other features of that Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility. Following much of the literature (Cutler and Gruber, 1997; Gruber, 1996a, 1996b; Ham and Shore-Sheppard, 2002 , and others), we are worried about the potential endogeneity of individual eligibility. Eligibility is a function of family income and family structure which are likely to have independent effects on health insurance offers and takeup. Thus we instrument an individual's actual eligibility with a simulated eligibility measure.
We calculate two different simulated eligibility measures, one based on a national sample of family characteristics, and a second based on an MSA specific sample of family characteristics. The first measure, which we call national simulated eligibility, is similar to that used in most past work. The second measure, which we call MSA-level simulated eligibility, which uses a distribution of family characteristics (income in particular) that varies across MSAs, but not over time, should better reflect that the wage and income distributions are very different across states. For example, incomes are much higher in New York State than in Texas, and accounting for this difference can substantially affect the calculated fraction of an MSA's population affected by a Medicaid expansion. We also make some potential improvements over past simulated eligibility measures. In particular, we will account for the fact that it is uncommon for parents to receive the AFDC/TANF child care deduction.
For national simulated eligibility we will use the family incomes (and other characteristics) for a random sample of 5000 children of a single year of age (0 to 14) from the entire urban U.S. and the entire sample period 1990-2000 (with dollar values indexed by the CPI-U). from entire period 1990-2000. We then use our eligibility calculator to determine the Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility of each of these children would have been in each of the years 1990-2000 in each of the 51 states. The calculated mean eligibility for a given age, state and year is merged into our dataset and matched by age*state*year to individuals in the dataset.
For MSA-level simulated eligibility we will use the MSA level distribution of income (and other characteristics) for all families with children under 18. We sample up to 500 children from the entire period 1990-2000 from each MSA. We then use our eligibility calculator to determine to determine what the Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility of each of these children would have been in that MSA in each of the years 1990-2000 if the child were each single year of age 0 to 14. The calculated mean eligibility for a given age, MSA and year is merged into our dataset and matched by age*MSA*year to individuals in the dataset.
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F. Other Individual and Metro Area Controls
We control for a number of other individual and metro area characteristics in our regression estimates. These characteristics include child age and race, type of family (only mother present, only father present), family size, number of working parents, the education of each parent, and whether a parent works for a large firm.
We include as controls several characteristics of metro areas that vary by MSA and year including the MSA-level unemployment rate and per capita income. We also include the private HMO penetration rate and the state Medicaid managed care rate. Both of the variables are described in detail in the data appendix.
Econometric Estimates
We analyze a large repeated cross-section sample of children from the CPS over the 1990-2000 period. Our main specification is a linear probability model for various types of coverage with controls for Medicaid eligibility, safety net variables, other metropolitan area variables, demographic variables, and other characteristics. Our main specification can be written as:
Here COVERAGE imt is an indicator variable for health insurance coverage of a given type for child i in MSA m and year t. Our main measures of coverage are private health insurance coverage and any health insurance coverage. CENTER_UC mt is one of our measures of health center safety net provided at the MSA level. In most cases, the measure is sliding discounts plus bad debt write-off per capita for the MSA and year. HOSPITAL_UC mt is one of our measures of the hospital safety net care provided at the MSA level. In most cases this measure is charity care plus bad debt per capita, adjusted for the difference between hospital list and actual prices, for the MSA and year. MEDICAID/SCHIP_ELIG imt is Medicaid or SCHIP eligibility. X includes child and family characteristics. Z includes the MSA by year level variables including unemployment rates and per capita income.
We will generally include MSA indicator variables when we use MSA simulated Medicaid eligibility, but report some estimates without them. We do not include MSA*year interactions because with them our safety net variables would not be identified. The results in Cutler and Gruber (1997) suggest that this identifying restriction is not too worrisome as they found that adding state*year interactions had little effect on their estimates (p. 406). Like all of the previous work in this area, we use linear probability models. However, we have explored the sensitivity of our estimates and examined how well the linearity assumption seems to approximate the data. squares and cubes of the remaining continuous variables. For the safety net variables and some other continuous variables we include (variable-overall mean) 2 and (variable-overall mean) 3 so that the coefficient on the linear term retains it's interpretation as the marginal effect at the means. We then add interactions of most of the discrete variables and many of the continuous variables. The interactions include interactions of components of X and Z with each other, Year*X, Year*Z, Age*X(except for age), Age*Z, State (or 10 Census regions)*X, State (or 10 Census regions)*Z. We will examine how the fraction of out of unit interval predictions changes for our key estimates and how the coefficients on the safety net variables change as we make the specification progressively less parametric.
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A. Descriptive Statistics
Tables 1 through 3 report descriptive statistics for the data we use. Table 1 reports overall means for our insurance coverage and policy variables over the 1990-2000 period, along with standard deviations and the range of the variables. We have over 186 thousand children ages 14 or less in our dataset. Overall, nearly 87 percent of children have some health insurance coverage and 67 percent have private coverage. Hospital uncompensated care averages $83 per capita. Center uncompensated care is on average much lower, at under two dollars per capita, though it is above $20 dollars per capita in several MSAs. More than ten percent of MSAs have no FQHCs, while another ten percent have center uncompensated care expenditures over five dollars per capita. Table 2 reports the mean and standard deviation for child and family characteristics for our sample. About one quarter of the sample of children our in single mother families. Nearly ninety percent of he children live in families with at least one employed adult, and a bare majority have two employed adults in the family. Table 3 reports how the means of our key variables change over time. So that sample composition changes do not affect the means, the sample for this table is limited to the 88 MSAs for which data are continuously available between 1990 and 2000. Despite having data on over 200 MSAs, we have some missing years of data for many MSAs. The fraction of children with any health insurance coverage falls over time before rising at the end of the period. The fraction with private coverage has a less pronounced fall and more pronounced rise at the end. Some of the rise in coverage at the end of the sample is due to a change in question wording (see Cutler, 2002 for example). We include year indicators in all of the regressions below so that the effect of this wording change should be sharply reduced.
Over our period, Medicaid eligibility rises sharply from under 26 percent of children 14 or under to 46 percent. Hospital uncompensated care more than doubles in real terms while health center uncompensated care increases sharply. There is a vary sharp rise in Medicaid Disproportionate Share (DSH) spending apparent in the early 1990s while state and local support for health centers rise more steadily. State and local support for hospitals and federal support for health centers show less of a clear pattern. While it cannot be discerned from Table 3, at the individual MSA level, hospital and center uncompensated care vary quite a bit over time. Table 4 reports our first set of regressions that show the determinants of any health insurance coverage and any private coverage. These regressions take our uncompensated care variables to be exogenous and we do not instrument for these variables here. Since we have stronger beliefs about our Medicaid eligibility variable being endogenous (since it is a function of income and family status), the columns labeled 2SLS instrument for Medicaid eligibility using a set of instruments that includes our MSA-level simulated eligibility variable.
B. Estimates Assuming Exogenous Uncompensated Care
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B1. Variation within MSAs over time
The estimates taking the uncompensated care variables to be exogenous provide an important baseline. We expect that safety net care will be mechanically greater where fewer people are covered by insurance and thus fewer have their care paid for by insurance. We also might think that government entities supporting the safety net would feel that there is greater need when there are more uncovered children. However, there are uncovered children in all metropolitan areas, so it is not clear how powerful this latter effect will be. Nevertheless, because of the first mechanical relationship we expect that safety net care will be greater in areas with lower child coverage, all else equal. Thus, we expect that the estimates taking uncompensated care to be exogenous will imply that safety net care is associated with lower overall insurance as well as lower private insurance. We begin by taking these estimates as an upper bound on the magnitude of potential adverse effects of the provision of safety net care on coverage.
The estimates of the effect of hospital and center uncompensated care in Table 4 suggest little or no crowd-out of private coverage. Focusing on the estimates in the fourth column, a fifty percent increase in hospital care is predicted to decrease coverage by between 3 and 4 tenths of one percentage point. We focus on the effect of a fifty percent increase in uncompensated care to provide an easily interpretable scaling of the coefficients. A fifty percent increase in center uncompensated care is predicted to lead to a minuscule increase in the likelihood of any coverage. The 95 percent confidence interval for the effect of center uncompensated care rules out a crowd-out effect of even one tenth of a percentage point. Thus, the estimates that take uncompensated care to be exogenous suggest essentially no effect of uncompensated care on coverage.
In some of these estimates we do consider Medicaid eligibility to be endogenous and we include MSA-level simulated eligibility as an instrument. Instrumenting for actual eligibility sharply changes its coefficient. In column three for example, the medicaid eligibility coefficient indicates that eligibility is associated with a thirty percentage point drop in private coverage. This coefficient is implausibly large and the instrumented variable in column four has a fairly precisely estimated coefficient of zero. Table 5 reports a second set of coverage regressions where uncompensated care is taken as exogenous, but Medicaid eligibility is instrumented. Because we do not include MSA indicators in most of these estimates, our simulated eligibility measure is national-level simulated eligibility. MSA-level simulated eligibility is a function of the MSA family 15 composition and earnings distribution and thus is likely correlated with the error term unless MSA indicators are included. In these estimates (particularly those in columns one, two, four and five) the main source of identifying variation for the uncompensated care variables is differences across MSAs in their usual level of uncompensated care. The largest crowd-out effect in the private coverage estimates of columns four and five suggests that a fifty percent increase in hospital uncompensated care would reduce private coverage by just under one and one-half percentage points. The estimates with state indicators are smaller and those with MSA indicators are even smaller. The estimated effects of centers associated with a fifty percent increase in uncompensated care are much smaller. Before MSA fixed effects are added, all of these coefficients are significantly different from zero. Again, we think of these estimates as an upper bound on the potential crowd-out effects of hospital and center uncompensated care. We now turn to the first stage regressions that are behind the 2SLS estimates in the paper.
B2. Variation across MSAs
C. The Determinants of Uncompensated Care and Medicaid Eligibility
Because of concerns about the potential endogeneity of the uncompensated care measures, we report below specifications where uncompensated care is treated as endogenous and is instrumented. As discussed earlier, there are several determinants of center uncompensated care that we believe are potentially uncorrelated with unmeasured determinants of coverage. In particular federal support for centers and state, local and other grants to centers. The determinants of hospital uncompensated care that we include as instruments are tax appropriations for hospitals, and federal DSH dollars. We also include the state budget surplus/deficit per capita as an instrument because the availability of funds may affect the support that is available for centers and hospitals as well as the willingness of the state to expand Medicaid. Table 6 reports the first stage regressions that show the determinants of uncompensated care and Medicaid eligibility. There are many interesting results here. First consider column one that reports the determinants of hospital uncompensated care. Simulated medicaid eligibility has a negative and statistically significant coefficient that suggests that when Medicaid eligibility is higher it leads to less hospital uncompensated care. As suggested earlier, this result might be expected because when Medicaid eligibility is higher it is more likely a low-income patient will have their bills paid through Medicaid rather than have them end up as uncompensated care. The magnitude of the estimated effect is moderately sized, as a ten percentage point increase in eligibility is estimated to decrease hospital uncompensated care by two percent. Tax appropriations are estimated to have a strong effect on hospital uncompensated care. For every dollar provided by states and localities, uncompensated care rises 27 cents.
7 State and local support for health centers is also associated with more uncompensated care by hospitals. Higher Medicaid managed care penetration is associated with lower uncompensated care. There are at least two possible explanations for this result. First, Medicaid managed care may imply a leaner and more competitive health care market. The resulting lower profits may lead to less 8 Currie and Fahr give reasonable arguments why Medicaid managed care is endogenous and use as instruments whether a state has a waiver allowing a managed care mandate and the fraction of the population subject to a mandatory managed care enrollment rule. We hope to calculate these variables for our sample and years and to then to treat penetration as endogenous. 16 uncompensated care as there are fewer opportunities to pay for the care through crosssubsidization. Second, higher Medicaid managed care penetration seems to be associated with higher Medicaid takeup, as we will see below and was found by Currie and Fahr (2002) . Higher Medicaid takeup could then mean less uncompensated care through the mechanical argument given above. 8 The significant determinants of center uncompensated care are state DSH funds and center support from state and local sources. State DSH programs often support health centers, so this result is not surprising. The significance of state and local support was expected.
One other result, or non-result, is worth mentioning. The unemployment rate and per capita income are not determinants of hospital and center safety net provision even though they are associated with uninsurance. This result suggests that need (the uninsurance rate) may not be the main determinant of safety net provision, but instead it is other factors such as local political leadership or local tastes for support for the safety net.
The determinants of Medicaid eligibility are mostly not surprising. The coefficient on MSA simulated eligibility is almost exactly one and is very precisely measured. The family structure and education variables have the expected signs and have strong and precisely estimated effects. It is not clear why a higher Medicaid managed care penetration rate is associated with higher eligibility given simulated eligibility. Higher unemployment increases eligibility which is expected given that the simulated eligibility calculation uses a distribution of income and other family characteristics that does not vary over time. A higher state budget surplus (or lower deficit) is associated with higher Medicaid eligibility.
D. Estimates Taking Uncompensated Care to be Endogenous
D1. Variation within MSAs over time.
Our first set of estimates that take uncompensated care to endogenous are reported in Table 7 . These estimates use the MSA-level simulated eligibility variable as an instrument. Because the MSA earnings distribution is incorporated in the instrument, we believe that it is important to control for MSA fixed effects with this instrument. Thus, for private coverage we focus on the estimates in column four. Since we are controlling for MSA and year, the identifying variation in these estimates comes from changes in uncompensated care within MSAs over time.
Using 2SLS and including MSA fixed effects leads the standard errors on the uncompensated care measures to rise substantially. While the hospital uncompensated care coefficient now has a positive sign suggesting no crowd-out, the standard error on the coefficient is so large that we cannot rule out substantial crowd-out. The center uncompensated care coefficient is now large and negative and suggests substantial crowd-out. The private coverage regressions suggest that a fifty percent increase in center uncompensated care results in a 2.5 percentage point fall in private coverage. This result is puzzling because we expected the estimates with center uncompensated care taken to be exogenous to be more negative than the 2SLS estimates. It is possible that some of our instrument are not quite as exogenous as we thought. Further investigation is warranted.
D2. Variation across MSAs.
We also consider estimates that rely mostly on the differences in the safety net across MSAs for their identifying variation. These estimates do not include MSA fixed effects, or in some cases, state fixed effects, and use national-level simulated eligibility as an instrument. The estimates are reported in Table 8 . Focusing on the private coverage regressions in columns four and five, the evidence is fairly mixed. The estimates without any fixed effects (but with controls for unemployment, per capita income, and managed care penetration) suggest that a fifty percent increase in uncompensated care at hospitals and centers would decrease private coverage by 1.3 and 0.2 percentage points respectively. The additional of state indicators changes these numbers to 0.0 and 0.5 percent.
E. Medicaid/SCHIP Takeup and Crowdout
As mentioned earlier, there is an extensive literature that has looked at the extent to which Medicaid coverage crowds out private health insurance coverage. We focus on this issue in Table 9 . Our long time period, MSA level data and controls, and controls for other components of the safety net, gives our dataset several key advantages over past data that have been used to examine this question. Focusing on the public coverage columns in Table 9 , the estimates suggest a Medicaid takeup rate of under ten percent. If we examine public plus nongroup coverage (columns two and five), for the reasons that some past work has suggested that SCHIP enrollees may mistake their coverage for private coverage, the takeup rate is just over ten percent. The effect of Medicaid eligibility on employer or union provided coverage (columns three and six) is small and insignificant or marginally significant. These estimates do suggest crowd-out on the order of twenty or twenty-five percent though. These estimates also suggest that the omission of controls for the hospital and center safety net may not be an important defect in past work on this topic. The estimates with and without these controls are very similar. We examined whether takeup and crowd-out have changed over time by splitting out time period into 1990-1995 and 1996-2000 . The estimates suggested somewhat higher takeup in the earlier period, and no crowd-out in the more recent period.
Discussion and Conclusions
There is an extensive literature on the extent to which public health insurance coverage through Medicaid induces less private health insurance coverage. However, little is known about the effect of other components of the health care safety net in crowding out private coverage. We examine the effect of Medicaid, and uncompensated care provided by clinics and hospitals on insurance coverage. We construct a long panel of metropolitan area data on hospital uncompensated care and free and reduced price care offered by Federally Qualified Health Centers. We match this information to individual level data on coverage from the Current Population Survey. Our preliminary results provide mixed evidence on the extent of crowd-out. Hospital care appears to have little crowd-out effect, but clinic care does substantially crowd-out private coverage in some specifications.
Less crowd-out for hospital uncompensated care may be plausible given that most hospital uncompensated care pays for big ticket items rather than more routine care that individuals may think of when making coverage decisions. Most of the arguments about the exogeneity of our uncompensated care measures suggests that our estimates should overstate the extent of crowdout. Similarly, the likely potential endogeneity concerns about our instruments would also suggest that we should overstate the extent of crowdout. That we do not find strong evidence of crowd-out suggests that the effects may be small if present. Further study of the determinants of uncompensated care provision is called for, and would shed light on the validity of potential instruments for uncompensated care.
Data Appendix
MSA Definitions:
MSA definitions follow the CPS definitions. The variables are aggregated at the MSA level using the same definitions as in the CPS. For years 1990 to 1994 the definition of MSA used is the 1983 one, while from 1995 to 2000 we use the 1993 definition.
Summary of the MSA Selection Criteria:
We start the 281 MSAs ever identified in the CPS between 1990 and 2000. We lose 27 of these because the MSAs are defined by a city, a parish or part of a county and thus cannot be identified solely through the use of county codes. We dropped an additional 29 because they are reported in the CPS in such a way (for nondisclosure reasons) that the reported geographic unit differs from the county based true MSA definition by more than ten percent of the population (not identified, not in sample). Of these MSAs, 13 are only identified for either 1990-1994 or 1995-2000, but not both. In addition, for 17 of these MSAs the definition changes are large enough to affect more than ten percent of the population. In this case, we include separate MSA dummy variables for the two periods, i.e. we treat them as different MSAs in the two periods. In summary, after exclusions, we are left with 139 stable MSAs over the entire period and an additional 63 MSAs available for the period 1990-1994 and an additional 53 available for the period 1995-2000.
Details of Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility calculator:
To be added.
Family characteristic variables used in simulated eligibility calculations:
The family characteristics that we take from the sample used to simulate eligibility are number of parents in family, number of children under 18, family income minus welfare income (this is equal to earned plus unearned income minus public assistance income), family earnings, and an indicator for whether either spouse in a two parent family worked more than 1200 hours in previous year (which is used to calculate eligibility for AFDC-UP).
Sources of other explanatory variables:
We obtain several MSA level variables by aggregating county level data from the Area Resource File (ARF). We use the ARF to obtain the population under 65, the unemployment rate, and per capita income. We are currently extrapolating to obtain per capita income for 2000.
Private and Medicaid HMO Penetration:
The private HMO penetration rate by county for the years 1990-2000 is provided by InterStudy Publications. Interstudy conducts primary survey research, surveying all full-service HMOs twice each year. The survey instrument, known as the InterStudy National HMO Census, collects data on key personnel, enrollment by product type, plan name and address, provider contract information, and many other topics. The methodology to derive county-level estimates of HMO enrollment is described in detail in Wholey et al. (1995) . We aggregate the county information to the MSA level using the same definition used in the CPS data.
The state Medicaid managed care rate is derived using administrative data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Using enrollment data in managed care plans and total Medicaid enrollment, we can calculate average Medicaid managed care penetration from 1990 to 2000. [-194.28-2710.03] 
